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AESTHETIC REGULATION:
A NEW GENERAL RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
Municipal authorities are frequently confronted with aesthetic
considerations in their efforts to improve the appearance and quality
of life in their cities. City councils, in furtherance of that goal, often
enact ordinances aimed at eradicating blight or unsightly structures.
Less frequently and with much less success, cities attempt aesthetic
regulation through abatement of certain conditions deemed "public
nuisances." The general rule usually stated is that aesthetics can
constitute an auxiliary factor but cannot be the sole basis to support
regulation of private property.1 However, a review of judicial op-
inions over the past two decades reveals a pattern of increasing ac-
ceptance of aesthetics alone as a valid basis of regulation. In light
of these findings, a more accurate restatement of the general rule
is that in certain situations, aesthetic considerations alone can justify
regulation of private property.
II. BACKGROUND
Deeply ingrained in American tradition, the prerogative of own-
ers to do as they please with their private property has created an
inherent tension between such rights and government regulation. In
prohibiting the taking of private property without compensation, the
Constitution reflects the sanctity of private property while at the
same time recognizing the sometimes greater public interest. A rare
exception to the fifth amendment "taking clause" is the valid ex-
ercise of police power. All government regulation of private property
represents to some degree a taking of property. Such regulation is
based on police power, indisputably mandated for public rather than
1. 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 147 (1949).
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private benefit and exercised only in the promotion of public health,
safety, morals, or welfare.
2
Early decisions struck down laws based solely or primarily on
aesthetics, although as a practical matter many courts upheld such
regulation so long as the laws were clothed in the more traditionally
accepted garments of public health or safety.3 Such subterfuge by
the courts has often been quite transparent. For example, despite
obviously aesthetic motives, a billboard regulation was upheld on
the grounds that it provided a hiding place for criminals, 4 and a
prohibition against erecting fences in front yards was upheld as pro-
moting public safety by allowing greater access for firefighters. 5
This practice by the courts of upholding aesthetic based legis-
lation under the due process clause or on some other more tradi-
tional nonaesthetic grounds has been criticized by commentators.6
In a 1955 seminal article on the subject, Professor Dukeminier com-
mented that "[t]hose courts which postulate that the police power
may not be exercised for aesthetic objectives obscure the goals to-
ward which community policy is directed and hinder a determination
of what types of aesthetic regulation are required by rational com-
munity planning." 7
Opposition to aesthetic regulation is based primarily on the no-
tion that agreements pertaining to standards of taste and beauty are
impossible to attain as they are subjective and vary greatly among
individuals. 8 Merely defining aesthetics presents practical difficulties.
A major problem faced by the courts is the search for objective
criteria upon which to determine the elusive concept of aesthetics.
2. Id.
3. 3 P. RomA, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 16.03 (1979).
4. See id. citing Dowds, Private Signs and Public Interests, 1974 INsT. ON PLAININo, ZoNING,
An Ermar Domrnm 221, 228.
5. Annotation, Zoning Regulations Prohibiting or Limiting: Fences, Hedges, or Walls, 1
A.L.R.4th 373 (1987).
6. See 3 P. RoaNr, supra note 3, at 16-17 n.16 for an extensive list of commentaries on
aesthetic zoning.
7. Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRODS.
218, 237 (1955).
8. See Comment, Aesthetic Zoning, 11 URB. L. REv. 295 (1976) which contains arguments
for and against aesthetic zoning.
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Dukeminier has suggested the "blind man test" which suggests that
if a use is offensive to a person with sight but not to a blind man
in the same situation, then the use is primarily offensive aestheti-
cally. 9 According to Dukeminier, attempts by the courts to define
beauty are not only fruitless but unnecessary:
This demand for precise criteria ... is at the bottom of the judicial refusal to
recognize openly aesthetics as a proper police power purpose.. . . But by asking
'what is beauty?' courts have got themselves into the semantic bog .... This
same bog lies in the field of jurisprudence, except that judges rarely decide cases
by inquiring first, 'what is justice?"0
Arguments articulated by Professor Dukeminier have been quoted
extensively by the courts and remain vital in the growing acceptance
of the doctrine of aesthetic regulation.
III. FOUNDATIONS OF AESTHIETIC REGULATION
Early concern with aesthetic regulation can be traced to public
reaction against unsightly billboards and other forms of outdoor
advertising that began to appear around the turn of the century. 1
The earliest decisions either struck down laws based on aesthetics
or ignored the aesthetic factor and upheld the ordinance on more
traditional health and safety grounds. But beginning with the Su-
preme Court decision in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.,12
which upheld comprehensive zoning as a valid exercise of the police
power, judicial attitudes on regulation became more liberal, and
acceptance of aesthetics as a valid auxiliary factor to support reg-
ulation became the general rule.13
Regulation actually designed to promote aesthetic goals has been
justified by the courts on a multitude of somewhat transparent
grounds: traffic safety arguments are often advanced to support bill-
board regulation;1 4 health factors are cited to support minimum floor
9. Dukeminier, supra note 7, at 223.
10. Id. at 225.
11. See supra note 3.
12. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13. 3 P. RoHA, supra note 3, § 16.04 (3)(b), at 106-07.
14. 3 P. RoHAN, supra note 3, § 16.04 (2)(2), at 59.
19871
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space regulations; 15 devaluation in property values justifies prohi-
bition of apartment buildings and mobile homes from single family
neighborhoods; 16 and economic benefits of tourism are used to sup-
port regulation of historic districts, billboards, and signs.17 But de-
spite these legitimate aesthetic motives for regulation, the courts based
their decisions on traditional grounds rather than accepting aesthetics
alone as a valid basis for the exercise of police power.
The landmark 1954 Supreme Court decision in Berman v. Parker"8
expanded the concept of public welfare to embrace aesthetics as a
valid basis for regulation. Although Berman was primarily concerned
with eminent domain as related to slum clearance, the language of
the Court strongly endorsed acceptance of aesthetics as a basis for
government action. Berman became a catalyst for the acceptance of
aesthetic regulation. The words of Justice Douglas have been cited
in virtually every jurisdiction that has adopted the modern view that
aesthetics alone can justify government regulation:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful, as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled. If those who govern . .. decide that the Nation's capital
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment
that stands in the way.' 9
IV. ACCEPTANCE OF AESTHETIC REGULATION
A. Early Decisions
During the 1960's, several courts began to apply the language
and logic of Berman to uphold municipal regulation based on aes-
thetic reasons alone. The foremost case was decided by the New
York Court of Appeals in People v. Stove °20 where a property owner
15. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Twp., 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed,
344 U.S. 919 (1953).
16. 3 P. RoHAN, supra note 3, § 16.04 (3)(a), at 91.
17. Id. § 16.04(3)(b), at 108.
18. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
19. Id. at 33.
20. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 NE.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), appeal dis-
missed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
[Vol. 90
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placed a clothesline filled with old rags in his front yard as a protest
against municipal taxes, adding an additional clothesline each year
for five years. When the city finally enacted an ordinance prohibiting
clotheslines in front or side yards abutting a street, the resident
objected that the ordinance violated his right to free speech. In a
major break with precedent, the court declared that aesthetics alone
could justify the exercise of the police power.21 The Stover decision
broke new ground and made a tremendous impact. It borrowed
extensively from the reasoning and writing of Dukeminier and has
been cited in most jurisdictions that adopted a similar position:
Once it be conceded that aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative concern, the
conclusion seems inescapable that reasonable legislation designed to promote that
end is a valid and permissible exercise of the police power. If zoning restrictions
which implement a policy of neighborhood amenity are to be stricken as invalid,
it should be, one commentator has said, not because they seek to promote 'aes-
thetic objectives' but solely because the restrictions constitute 'unreasonable de-
vices of implementing community policy.' (Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic
Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 Law and Contemp. Prob. 218, 231.) Consequently,
whether such a statute or ordinance should be voided should depend upon whether
the restriction was 'an arbitrary and irrational method of achieving an attractive,
efficiently functioning, prosperous community - and not upon whether the ob-
jectives were primarily aesthetic.' (Dukeminier, loc. cit.)2
Subsequent New York decisions firmly established the aesthetic reg-
ulation rule adopted in Stover by upholding on aesthetic grounds
regulation of billboards, 23 open storage of inoperable vehicles, 24 dis-
play of offensive sexual material, 25 and prohibition of boathouses
on a section of a resort lake. 26
Gradually, the Stover rule spread to other jurisdictions. It has
been most often adopted to support the regulation of junkyards,
signs, and billboards. In the 1960's, Kentucky, 27 Ohio,2 and Oregon 29
21. Id.
22. Id. at 467, 191 N.E.2d at 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
23. Cromwell v. Ferrier, "19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
24. People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286, 258 N.E.2d 206, 309 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1970).
25. People v. Lou Bern Broadway, Inc., 325 N.Y.S.2d 806, (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 342
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1972), rev'd, 345 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (1973).
26. McCormick v. Lawrence, 83 Misc. 2d 64, 372 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd,
387 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1976).
27. Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964).
28. Ohio v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 163
(1969).
29. Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
19871
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became the earliest jurisdictions to accept aesthetics alone as a valid
basis for exercise of the police power in the regulation of junkyards.
Generally, regulation or prohibition of billboards has been up-
held on the more traditional health and safety grounds, specifically
for the promotion of traffic safety. The modern trend, however, is
toward recognizing aesthetic reasons alone as justification for reg-
ulation of advertising. Two of the most notable decisions in this
area were John Donnelly and Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising
Bd.30 and Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield.31 In
Outdoor Advertising, the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld on
aesthetic grounds a Brookline ordinance prohibiting non-accessory
or off-premise signs. In Westfield Motors, the New Jersey Supreme
Court provided an extensive analysis of the aesthetics issue in sup-
port of its decision upholding sign regulation. The court concluded
that: "it is now appropriate to permit a municipality, under proper
safeguards, to legally deal with the problem without subterfuge.
Zoning solely for aesthetic purposes is an idea whose time has come;
it is not outside the scope of the police power."' 32
Illinois has also upheld sign regulations on similar grounds: "[ilt
has been repeatedly held by the courts of Illinois that aesthetic fac-
tors do have a significant bearing upon zoning to such an extent
that they may, in some instances, be used as the sole basis to validate
a zoning classification. ' 33
The state of Washington in 1977 acknowledged protection of
aesthetic values as an expressed and legitimate public policy in State
Dept. of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr.34 In Pacesetter, the dispute
arose over a statutory building height restriction prohibiting con-
struction of any structure over thirty-five feet high that would ob-
struct the view of adjoining landowners. 5 The construction company
was in the process of building two houses in violation of the thirty-
30. John Donnelly and Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709
(1975).
31. Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 324 A.2d 113 (1974).
32. Id. at 539, 324 A.2d at 119.
33. Ward v. Cook County, 68 Ill. App. 3d 563, 386 N.E.2d 309 (1979).
34. State Dep't of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977).
35. Id. at 204, 571 P.2d at 197-98.
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five feet restriction when the action was filed by adjoining land-
owners.3 6 The court ordered removal of the houses under construc-
tion and awarded the adjoining landowners damages for loss of view
until abatement.
37
Often a court will also take notice of the economic relationship
between aesthetics and tourism in adopting aesthetics as a valid basis
of regulation, on the theory that promotion of tourism promotes
the public welfare.3 8 This is especially true in traditional tourist mec-
cas like Florida and Hawaii. Florida was one of the earliest juris-
dictions to recognize the validity of aesthetics as a basis for regulation,
because of the economic impact of aesthetic considerations on tour-
ism.3 9 In Hawaii, aesthetic concerns have been recognized as being
so important as to justify express provisions for aesthetic regulation
in the state constitution: "[t]he State shall have the power to con-
serve and develop its natural beauty, objects, and places of historic
or cultural interest, sightliness and physical good order, and for that
purpose private property shall be subject to reasonable regulation."
40
Furthermore, in the often cited opinion of State v. Diamond Mo-
tors,41 the Hawaii Supreme Court stated unequivocally: "[w]e accept
beauty as a proper community objective, attainable through the use
of police power. We are mindful of. . .the need felt by [other courts]
to find some basis in economics, health, safety, or even morality." 42
Courts have also been amenable to upholding common residential
zoning regulations related to house setbacks, floor space require-
ments, fences, topsoil removal, mobile home locations, and building
height restrictions. 43 In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,44 the Su-
preme Court upheld an ordinance restricting land use to one-family
36. Id.
37. Id. at 212, 571 P.2d at 196.
38. See supra note 17.
39. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Island Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941); Stone v.
City of Maitland, 446 F,2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. HAw. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 5.
41. State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Haw. 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967).
42. Id. at 35, 429 P.2d at 827.
43. 3 P.RoHAN, supra note 3, at 2.
44. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
19871
7
Pace: Aesthetic Regulation: A New General Rule
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
dwellings. The opinion of the Court contained very expansive lan-
guage relating to regulation in residential areas:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs ....
The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for peo-
ple .... 4S
Residential neighborhoods aside, aesthetics receive more liberal ac-
ceptance in areas dependent on tourism, where a close link exists
between economics and aesthetics.
B. Recent Decisions Upholding Aesthetic Regulation
Popular interest and concern with aesthetic regulation reached
a peak during the late 1960's and early 1970's. Since that time,
acceptance of aesthetics has plodded quietly but steadily along. Dur-
ing the past decade, the list of jurisdictions adopting aesthetics as
a legitimate basis of regulation continued to expand.
One of the most significant decisions of the 1980's on aesthetics
has been Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.46 The California
court upheld a San Diego ordinance banning all off-site billboard
advertising. The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision
on the grounds that it violated the billboard owners' right of free
speech.47 Although the major issue in the case, especially in the Su-
preme Court, revolved around the notion of free speech, both courts
gave considerable attention to the aesthetic regulation question.
Among other reasons, the plaintiffs in Metromedia challenged
the ordinance because its principal purpose was to promote the ap-
pearance of the community, a ground held insufficient by the Cal-
ifornia court in Varney & Green v. Williams.48 The court responded
45. Id. at 9.
46. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510
(1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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by repudiating Varney as being "unworkable" and "discordant with
modern thought. ' 49 The opinion of the court was influenced by the
strong nexus existing between economics and aesthetics which "to-
gether constitute the warp and woof of the fabric upon which the
modern city must design its future.
'"50
In support of its adoption of aesthetic regulation, the California
court quoted extensively from both the Berman and Stover decisions,
as well as citing several jurisdictions that had adopted a similar
doctrine, concluding that:
Present day city planning would be virtually impossible under a doctrine which
denied a city authority to legislate for aesthetic purposes under the police power.
Virtually every city in this state has enacted zoning ordinances, for the purpose
of improving the appearance of the urban environment and quality of metro-
politan life.,,
The Supreme Court, while reversing on other grounds, reaffirmed
its approval of aesthetic regulation established years earlier in the
Berman decision.
In a concurring opinion in Metromedia, Justice Brennan qual-
ified the right of a city to regulate private property for aesthetic
purposes.12 Brennan believed that a city must demonstrate a sub-
stantial commitment to promotion of aesthetics before infringing
upon private property by government regulation and that "a court
must be convinced that the city is seriously and comprehensively
addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its environment." 53 Thus,
while Brennan would approve strict regulation in historic commu-
nities like Williamsburg, Virginia or in national parks, he would not
be likely to do the same in business or industrial sections of a large
city absent a genuine and substantial demonstration of comprehen-
sive commitment to aesthetic improvement.
In 1982, two additional states joined the ranks of those em-
bracing the aesthetic regulation doctrine. North Carolina expressly
49. Metromedia, 26 Cal. 3d at 861, 610 P.2d at 413, 164 Cal. Reptr. at 516.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 862, 610 P.2d at 414, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
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overruled its former "aesthetics as auxiliary" position in favor of
aesthetics alone as a valid basis of regulation, "depending on the
facts and circumstances of each case.'' 54 New Mexico took a similar
stand in Temple Baptist Church v. City of Albuquerque,55 where
the court discussed arguments supporting both sides of the issue
before deciding that "[w]e are of the opinion that the better rule
is that aesthetic considerations alone do justify exercise of police
power." 56
A recent Colorado decision appears to expand the concept of
aesthetic regulation beyond the typical application. In Landmark
Land v. City and County of Denver,57 the court upheld Denver's
Mountain View Ordinance, which placed height restrictions on build-
ings within a stated radius of certain city parks in order to protect
the mountain view.58 Property owners who wanted to construct
buildings in excess of the height restrictions had challenged the or-
dinance.5 9 But the Colorado Supreme Court, taking notice that the
trial judge had visited the parks and found a "panoramic mountain
view," sustained the ordinance. 0 Citing a significant association be-
tween the identity of Denver and its dramatic mountain view, the
court held that it was "rationally related to the legitimate public
purpose of protection of aesthetics." 61 Accordingly, while the Moun-
tain View Regulation might not necessarily be upheld everywhere,
a similar regulation would be valid where aesthetic considerations
can be closely identified with some substantial public interest.
In another recent decision relating to scenic protection, a federal
district court in Nevada sustained aesthetic-based regulation in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation v. Tahoe Regional Planning.6 2 Landowners in
the scenic Lake Tahoe area challenged regulations promulgated by
54. State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982).
55. Temple Baptist Church v. City of Albuquerque, 98 N.M. 138, 646 P.2d 565 (1982).
56. Id. at 651, 646 P.2d at 571.
57. Landmark Land v. City of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986), appeal dismissed, 107 S.
Ct. 3222 (1987).
58. Id. at 1287.
59. Id. at 1282-83.
60. Id. at 1284.
61. Id. at 1281,1284.
62. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation v. Tahoe Regional Planning, 638 F. Supp. 126 (D. Nev. 1986).
[Vol. 90
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the regional planning board on the grounds that the board could
not regulate their activity unless it was found to be a nuisance. 63
The court stated that it was "not limited to a determination of
whether the regulations apply only to noxious activities or dangerous
structures," citing the Berman decision in upholding the regulation. 64
V. LIMITATIONS ON AESTHETIC REGULATION
Apparently, there are certain clear limitations to regulation based
on aesthetics. Regulation cannot interfere with free speech, partic-
ularly where the content of the message is affected. 65 Similarly, total
suppression of erotic materials that have some arguable artistic value
is not tolerated. 66
Additionally, it is significant to note that aesthetics have not
expanded into areas of traditional nuisance law. For example, a
building cannot be condemned because of its dilapidated appearance
or because it diminishes the value of surrounding property. 67 Like-
wise, a city cannot require the owner of an overgrown or unsightly
lot to clean his property. It has been held that the "deposit of debris,
rubbish, and other unsightly material" on a person's property does
not constitute a nuisance, and "mere unsightliness or other condition
of a purely aesthetic nature are alone insufficient to justify a court's
interference." 68
The constitutional "taking" clause of the fifth amendment also
imposes limitations upon all regulation based on police power. The
line between the police power and eminient domain is not clearly
drawn but rather is a matter of degree, and there has been extensive
litigation in this unsettled area of law.69
63. Id. at 134.
64. Id.
65. Metromedia, 453 U.S. 502.
66. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
67. Bristol Door and Lumber Co. v. City of Bristol, 97 Va. 304, 33 S.E. 588 (1899); 13 AM.
JuR. 2d Buildings § 41 (1987).
68. State Rd. Comm'n v. Oakes, 150 W. Va. 709, 720, 149 S.E.2d 293, 300 (1966).
69. See Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 16, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972).
1987]
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VI. RECENT DECISIONS MOVING TowAlu AESTHETIC REGULATION
In addition to those states that have expressly adopted the aes-
thetic regulation doctrine, a number of jurisdictions have indicated
approval of the idea in dicta. States that have demonstrated a re-
ceptive attitude toward aesthetics include Connecticut, 70 Delaware, 71
Georgia, 72 Idaho,73 Indiana,74 Kansas,75 Maryland, 76 Michigan, 77 Mis-
souri, 78 New Hampshire,79 North Dakota, 80 Wisconsin,8' and West
Virginia.8 2
VII. CONCLUSION
That the police power can only be exercised to promote the public
health, safety, morals, and welfare is indisputable. Historically, courts
were reluctant to equate aesthetic considerations for the general wel-
fare with health and safety. Gradually, the general rule developed
that aesthetics could constitute an auxiliary factor to justify regu-
lation but could not be the sole or primary reason. Following the
Berman and Stover decisions, aesthetics began to gain increasing
acceptance. That trend continued throughout the 1970's and 1980's
and today it appears to represent the majority position.
70. Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm'n of Norwich, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d 163 (1976) (aes-
thetic considerations may have a definite relation to public welfare).
71. Petition of Franklin Builders, Inc., 58 Del. 173, 207 A.2d 12 (1964) (upholding billboard
regulation).
72. Dills v. Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983) (would
have upheld on aesthetic grounds, rather than on overbroad general statement of purpose).
73. Dawson Enter., Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977).
74. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930).
75. Houston v. Board of Comm'rs of Wichita, 218 Kan. 323, 543 P.2d 1010 (1975) (there is
an aesthetic side of municipal development which may be fostered . . . such legislation is merely
liberalized application of general welfare purposes).
76. Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz Inc., 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973).
77. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47, 199 N.W,2d 525 (1972).
78. State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851
(1971).
79. Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 266 A.2d 103 (1970).
80. Newman Signs, Inc. v. HJelle, 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1978).
81. State ex reL. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
82. Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960) (the police power is as broad and
comprehensive as the demands of society make necessary).
[Vol. 90
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Concern with aesthetics began with the proliferation of billboards
and outdoor advertising around the turn of the century and ex-
panded with increased urbanization into concern over zoning re-
gulations in Euclid, Boraas, and Metromedia. The close nexus
between aesthetics and economics in an urban society has provided
an impetus for acceptance by many states. While a majority of ju-
risdictions now seem to approve of aesthetic regulation, the specific
instances where it might support such regulation appear to vary sig-
nificantly. The Supreme Court has been liberal in upholding reg-
ulation on aesthetic grounds, leaving it up to the legislative bodies
so long as regulation does not infringe upon a constitutional right.
In 1955, Professor Dukeminier proposed that if regulations are
to be held invalid, it should not be because they are based on aes-
thetic considerations but because "they are unreasonable devises [sic]
of implementing community policy." ' 83 The logic and soundness of
this argument has finally been accepted by most states in upholding
aesthetics regulation as a valid public policy.
Michael Pace
83. Dukeminier, supra note 7, at 231.
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